Participation, Civil Society, and Democracy
Participation can lead to the enfranchisement of previously disenfranchised segments of the population. Nevertheless, historically, few political and social rights have been acquired as an outcome of participation. Consider the electoral rule of "one person-one vote," an outgrowth of the democratic belief that all people share the same basic political values irrespective of their position in society. In his examination of modern European history, Macpherson (1977) shows that this belief matures to a widely shared truth only when the ruling class is convinced that the poor majority is not a threat to their rule. The vote was granted by the emerging ruling classes; it was not demanded by the poor. The origin of modern liberal democracy rests on a disturbing assumption: The elite compete to rule but voters remain apathetic. 4 If we examine social rights, it is also not clear that they derive from participatory movements or democratic pressure. The beginning of the modern pension system dates from the rule of Bismarck in Germany. 5 In Latin America, it was dictators such as Peron in Argentina and
Vargas in Brazil who pushed for and enacted some of the most important social legislation. For years, the authoritarian Soviet Union was looked upon as a model for women's rights legislation.
Moreover, a dynamic civil society may fail to express itself politically. Jose Murilo Carvalho (1987) gives a dismaying description of how Brazil attained its democracy. In 1889, the same population of Rio de Janeiro that was remarkably well organized in its revolt against the mandatory variola vaccination was apathetic to the political movement against the empire. In fact, most residents of the city confused the transit of military troops (part of the "palace coup" that resulted in the First Republic) with a military parade.
and incisive comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
Why then is participatory democracy such an attractive, unifying concept? And why does it have so many constraints? Perhaps the concept is attractive because, as Macpherson (1977, p. 94) has argued, "low participatory and social inequalities are so bound up with each other that a more equitable and humane society requires a more participatory political system." It has two important constraints: size and the difficult path of implementation.
... most of the questions that would need to be asked in our present complex societies could scarcely be formulated by citizen groups specifically enough for the answers to give a government a clear directive. Nor can the ordinary citizen be expected to respond to the sort of questions that would be required to give a clear direction. The questions would have to be as intricate as, for instance, having to ask questions such as "what percent unemployment rate would you accept in order to reduce the rate of inflation by x percent?," or, "what increase in the rate of (a) income tax, (b) sales tax, (c) other taxes {specify which}, would you accept in order to increase by blank per cent {fill in the blank}, the level of (1) old age pensions, (2) health services, (3) other social services {specify which}, (4) any other benefits {specify which}." (Macpherson, 1977 p. 95) .
The path to, and the functioning of, participatory democracy demands citizens who are more than consumers. They should also struggle for political power, develop capacities to acquire political power, and enjoy the exercise of political power. All these activities are based, presumably, on a sense of community. More important, they are predicated on a just society or, at least, on a society that views itself as just. For harsh and deeply felt inequalities require a nonparticipatory party system to hold society together.
These various requirements for a functioning democracy may contradict one another.
Macpherson (1977 pp. 95-96) notes:
We seem to be caught in a vicious circle. For it is unlikely that either of these prerequisite changes could be effected without stronger democratic participation than there is now. The reduction of social and economic inequalities is unlikely without strong democratic actions. And it would seem, whether we follow Mill or
Marx, that only through actual involvement in joint political action can people transcend the consciousness of themselves as consumers and appropriators. Hence the vicious circle: we cannot achieve more democratic participation without a prior change in social inequality and in consciousness, but we cannot achieve the changing social inequality and consciousness without a prior increase in democratic participation.
And the obstacles are greater still in developing countries, where the call for participatory democracy may come before liberal democracy is achieved. There, fractions of the elite, instead of competing under established ground rules, are often engaged in civil wars. While working in Angola, one of the authors was once told that "the civil war is not our war; we just die in it."
Can the vicious circle be broken? Can the obstacles be reduced? The historical record provides a categorical answer: Yes. Incremental benefits and lower inequalities can change the image people at the bottom have of themselves-from victims to survivors-and this provides a critical stimulus to participation. A crisis may also stimulate social action. Participation, in turn, pushes for further incremental change in the distributive system. This is evident in the spread of workers' participation in the design of work rules, in the long and successful tradition of self- There is a strong demand for participatory and community-based development programs not because they promote democracy, although they may. The attraction is their capacity to achieve redistribution with incremental localized gains. In the context of a specific project, participation can be used to interpret demands and produce a better match between project outputs and local wants; it can be used to align the distribution of benefits and costs with the needs and aspirations of the community.
Using Participation to Identify Demand
Public agencies often base their actions on standards. So many hospital beds per thousand people, so many nurses per so many hospital beds, and so on. Standards are derived from perceived needs and technical characteristics. As Pritchett (1996) has argued, this belief, fixed firmly in bureaucratic thinking, has become part of conventional wisdom. It has taken decades of painful experience and failed projects to see that it is wrong. 7 The reliance on needs-based standards is misplaced because individuals act to satisfy demands, which are highly specific to individuals or groups, and governments act to satisfy political interests, which may not coincide with the needs of particular individuals or groups. Centralized and technocratic solutions have two consequences.
Either the pattern of service provision will be uniform across all areas, irrespective of differences, or there will be attempts to adjust services by "technical coefficients" in response to a new set of standards.
There is therefore a strong case for decentralization-for mechanisms that enable the provision of services to be more responsive to local preferences. The provision of goods and services should be based on demands, not needs. Moreover, the least-cost way to provide goods and services may not be through a framework of universal, free, and monopoly provision by government. Participation is a powerful method of determining demand and helps agencies resolve the vexing question of how to provide goods and services-and who should provide them.
Does Participation Reveal Demand Effectively?
Participation by individuals allows institutions to determine what it is that people want. But in the presence of markets, is participation needed to identify demand? Competitive markets allow individuals and households to express their preferences under a much broader set of conditions than nearly all other forms of participation, and they do so better and at lower cost. Moreover, competitive markets discriminate among individual demands according to a single variablepurchasing power. Unlike other social constructs for exchange, markets simultaneously exchange information about preferences, relative scarcities, quality, and reputation. Competitive markets thus dominate other forms of participation and exchange.
Markets, however, have some well-known limitations, which can be overcome by participatory institutions. Market preference can only be known and measured after exchange. A market without exchange or with insufficient exchange fails to reveal social preferences adequately, as does a market without sufficient competition among buyers and sellers. In developing countries, despite the widespread and growing use of market institutions, there still are pockets of the population that are so loosely integrated with the market that the very concept of market preference or demand may not apply. In general, preferences revealed in the market are constrained by what is supplied to and demanded from the market (an adequate estimate of the demand for airplanes cannot be constructed without a well-developed concept of an airplane).
Markets do not price dreams, yet actions (and institutions) may be inspired by dreams;
preferences may be symbolic and difficult (if not impossible) to price.
Furthermore, even when markets can work they frequently fail to do so. Consider the following: The economics literature on public service provision has been powerfully influenced by Tiebout (1956) . 8 Samuelson (1954 Samuelson ( , 1955 had proved that the market could not secure an efficient allocation of resources in an economy with both public and private goods. It was defeated by the nonexcludability and nonrivalry properties of the public good. 9 Tiebout countered that if public goods were "local," in the sense that benefits were limited to a defined geographical area, a quasi market mechanism was restored through the ability of individuals to choose the jurisdiction in which they lived (or, by extension, the group with which they associated).
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As Stiglitz (1983) has argued, Tiebout's basic insight was to argue that if individuals were mobile among communities, or if they could create their own communities, the three fundamental problems associated with the provision of public goods would be resolved.
For private goods, individuals reveal their preferences in the process of purchasing goods;
for public goods, the problem of elicitation must be resolved some other way. Unfortunately, the solution is not so simple in everyday life. In everyday life, Stiglitz (1983) shows that "community-type" solutions are unambiguously good solutions only in a very special case. The market allocation solution is faulty when (a) there is imperfect information and individuals or groups can acquire information and/or be influenced by the actions of others; (b) there are incomplete future or risk markets; and (c) there are economies of scale in production that result in only a subset of the set of potential goods being produced.
A participatory community (one that creates extramarket mechanisms for coordination and enforcement) could address many of the problems of imperfect and incomplete information (problems (a) and (b) above); and a system of participatory communities could face up to the problem of scale. To see why, consider the following three common forms of market failures:
Asymmetric information. Suppose you want to borrow money from me. If I know as much about your ability to repay the loan as you do, I would be well equipped to make a decision about lending to you. But, in fact, I know less about your ability to repay the loan than you do, making it more difficult for me to evaluate the risk involved in lending to you. Moreover, if you have information that would help me make a decision, but my decision affects your well-being, you may have an incentive not to share all of your information with me, a possibility I anticipate.
As a consequence of this asymmetry, I make a less efficient decision than I otherwise would have.
A mediator who has some additional information about the parties could help by sharing that information and correcting misinformation held by others. Local credit cooperatives are sometimes able to function efficiently where banks fail because they share information, even if they do not disclose it. In this case, trust and creditworthiness are conditions for participation, and loss of reputation is the penalty for misconduct.
Disreputable information. Markets fail in the absence of confidence in the information that is available, and the outcome may be collective paralysis. If I lack information that I believe will be made available tomorrow, I will likely put off making a decision until tomorrow. One way to reduce the lack of confidence is to design contracts with contingencies. Forms of participation can be used, therefore, to overcome some types of market failure.
They can do so by creating alternative instruments for collective action. To be sure, the appeal to collective action introduces another set of problems. If collective action is to be enforced, with the possible penalty of outlawing the individual from the community, collective action must be supported by rational or traditional rules enacted by governments or arranged, imposed, or agreed on within the group. There are no homogeneous or harmonious communities in real life.
Participatory decisionmaking can coalesce heterogeneous groups by providing agreement on the losses. Individuals would not need to move to another community or form a new one.
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Does Participation Ensure the Best Interests of the Group?
The fact that decisions are made collectively does not mean that they represent the best interests of the group. Determining whether the decisions represent the group's best interest is difficult because it requires comparing interpersonal well-being, whether by aggregating preferences or establishing a hierarchy of preferences. Moreover, it is not clear how best to design, implement, and monitor an instrument based on collective action. Participation demands regulation by government action, by those directly involved in the interaction, or by both.
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It is useful to distinguish, as do Braybrooke and Lindblom (1970) , between preemptory and perfectible regulations. Consider a participatory decision on whether to establish a dental care
program at a school. Some of the parents that sit on the school's board of directors support the idea of establishing the clinic. They are willing to conduct a survey, establish priorities, and consult other members of the community before making a decision.
Opponents of the proposal believe that the school should not be responsible for dental care and that policy matters that are not related to the school or its curriculum lie outside the domain of the board, which should therefore not consider the issue. According to the opponents, In other cases, however, the outcome of participation is less certain. Participation itself does not ensure sustainability. Participation by a misinformed community group can distort public policy. 13 It may lead to waste; for example, women cooperatives in Chiapas, Mexico, have made costly and useless investments based on incorrect communally held information. Participation could be the key to environmental protection, but it may lead to very wrong technical decisions on what and how to protect.
14 Participation is a social act that springs from a preexisting set of social relations. It requires leadership and organization, attributes that must be created within the community and that, ultimately, reflect its values and goals. Participation begins with trust and is, therefore, more readily applied in situations that fortify communal values. When it is used to achieve "radical" (e.g., redistributive) outcomes, it typically seeks a redistribution from other groups to the group in question, not redistributions within the group. For this very reason it can and should be regulated--to ensure its consistency with the broader norms and mores of society, including its legality. If an indigenous community condemns women to illiteracy and is ruled by strictly patriarchal maledominated norms, participatory means can not be used to induce the community to offer education for girls. What participation does allow, importantly, is for the adjustment of nonpreemptory norms to the interests of the group.
Does Participation Strengthen Individual Rights?
Submission, exclusion, and social dysfunctionality. If participation interprets demands it follows pronouncement. In Hirschman's lexicon participation is voice, not exit-and it is also loyalty.
More subtly, participation involves consent on acceptable losses; it solicits the postponement, or even omission, of private interests (as reflected in such proverbial sayings as "act in haste, repent at leisure" or "look before you leap"). It requires good sense in that it should reflect customary rather than idiosyncratic values. Participation may be either unnecessary or disruptive-market and/or administrative solutions might be better. Consider, for example, activity within a firm. What transpires within the firm is not mediated by standard market mechanisms, but it is closely linked with what goes on outside the firm. As Marx showed in his analysis of the factory system, the most effective systems of management within the firm (those that have survived historically) mimic the systems used to determine actions in the external environment.
For instance, firms often pay wages in excess of opportunity costs (the efficiency wage theory). They do so not for altruistic or paternalist reasons but because they recognize that higher wages induce greater effort by motivating workers to work harder. Higher wages also benefit management in other ways (by increasing selectivity in hiring and reducing turnover, for example).
The complex system of rules determining rights, responsibilities, rewards, and arbitration of disputes and conflicting interests affects the firm's bottom line by increasing productivity and profits.
Observing how decisions are made in practice might thus furnish lessons on the right way to make "local" distributive decisions. We would like to think that local institutions evolve endogenously to serve more than individual ambitions. The question is, do local institutions improve social outcomes? Do they reflect adequately the distribution of local wants and needs?
There are no simple answers to these questions; local institutions may improve collective welfare but not necessarily or even usually.
It is difficult to show that more participatory schemes outperform less participatory schemes, when there is the option of using either one or the other. For example, participatory "quality control circles" were introduced by many firms in response to increasingly complex, interconnected tasks. The outcome has been uneven. At some level, giving workers a greater autonomy increases productivity and workers' satisfaction. But the system demands new forms of hierarchy, and it is difficult to generalize the positive association between worker control and output for all jobs. It is even harder to show that social innovations, such as "quality control groups" or "neighborhood associations," are evolutionary steps that progress "naturally" to desired or generally accepted social outcomes. In particular, we know that schemes developed to address market failure may become dysfunctional after the market begins to work better, since they can distort the operation of markets and reduce welfare.
To see why this is so, consider Arnott and Stiglitz's (1991) classic example of the market for automobile insurance. One way in which the insurance market responds to moral hazard is to require copayments in order to provide individuals with incentives to avoid accidents. But the need to make copayments means that individuals purchase less insurance than they otherwise would. To obtain the level of coverage they would have had in the absence of coinsurance, they may enter into nonmarket mutual insurance agreements. Marriage, in which each spouse implicitly (sometimes explicitly) insures the other, may represent one such mechanism.
Can a normative position on this arrangement be developed that is socially optimal?
Whatever its other merits, marriage is not the best way to provide automobile insurance. Not, that is, unless both spouses agree that their utility is fully interdependent (each always acting as if the other's utility depended on his or her efforts), each spouse can monitor the other perfectly, and both spouses agree to this monitoring system and the sanctions it implies-an unconventional marriage indeed.
Nonmarket insurance is suboptimal because for market insurance to work efficiently the quantity of insurance provided by insurance companies must be less than the quantity of insurance demanded by drivers. If this condition is not met, drivers would face no financial incentive to avoid accidents. Recognizing that spouses provide each other with some nonmarket insurance, insurance companies reduce the quantity of insurance they offer. In the end the total quantity of insurance provided is unchanged, but it is provided at a higher cost than it would have been had insurance companies been the sole providers of insurance, because insurance companies are better able than spouses to pool risks and thus to lower costs.
In this example, nonmarket participatory insurance is harmful and dysfunctional since it cannot improve on the equilibrium achieved without nonmarket insurance. The provision of nonmarket insurance does not enhance the risk-sharing capabilities of the economy. Instead, it simply crowds out market insurance. The simultaneous provision of market and nonmarket insurance also violates exclusivity (the need for insurers to limit the quantity of insurance), which typically creates negative externalizes that cannot be internalized and therefore lead to higher costs.
The example vividly illustrates the functionalism fallacy: the fact that an institution (nonmarket insurance) has a clearly identifiable function (to improve risk sharing by supplementing the rationed insurance provided by the market) does not mean that it actually performs that function.
Local rules and local justice. The ways in which people sort out the problems of allocation and distribution are varied and complicated. Collective, participatory decisions should, but frequently fail to, confront justice and fairness. Elster (1991) and Elster and Roemer (1991) have examined justice at the level of the community, the group, and the firm, studying decisions on selecting organ transplant recipients, admitting students to institutions of higher learning, allocating public resources, selecting workers to be laid off in a retrenchment program, and distributing "protection money" received from local drug lords. There are no optimal solutions. Doctors and other specialist allocators do not see their role as that of redressing social injustice. They are specialized providers of specific services, not promoters of overall welfare. They may be willing to compensate for bad luck that falls within their specific domain but not for bad luck overall. A person in need of a kidney may be compensated for kidney-related bad luck, but usually not for other kinds of medical bad luck, and definitely not for nonmedical bad luck. If the specialists are aware that there is a bigger picture, they leave it to others. Often, however, nobody feels responsible for the big picture. The many local justice decisions that are made by different institutions with respect to the same individual can add up to a global injustice (Elster 1991, p. 126) .
His conclusions are not encouraging:
The main impression is that it is a messy business. Usually the institution acknowledges that more than one feature of the individual is relevant for the allocation decision.
Sometimes . . . explicit weights are assigned to the various features. More frequently, this weighting is left to the discretionary decision of the administrators. Often, there is some discrepancy between the official principles and actual practice. Sometimes, tortuous explanations are given to reconcile practice and principle . . . . More frequently, the principles are just violated in secret. Reaching agreement on a principle is often achieved at the cost of some vagueness about interpretation and implementation (Elster 1991, p. 114).
Historically, of course, pacts were made and collective action assumed definite forms.
Most of these pacts involved coercion; much of classical philosophy is devoted to the search for balance between confidence and compulsion. It would be presumptuous to deny the lessons from this distinguished history. But if the search must be made in this context, it is hard to believe that it would be conclusive. Arrow (1975) has noted that individuals may derive satisfaction from someone else's gain. Camaraderie allows for complex social contracts, of which participatory schemes are a prime example. But there are narrow limits to camaraderie. What guarantees that the agreements will be respected? Why share burdens and costs and not free-ride on the achievements of others? What enforces reputation, and how do we live in the minds of others? it more or less messy than when it is not. The fact that decisions are made by highly qualified people such as deans, doctors, and entrepreneurs does not ensure the quality, fairness, or transparency of decisions. A growing body of microevidence suggests that if the interested parties (for example, students, administrators, teachers) are represented in the decisionmaking process and "own" its outcome, then autocratic decisions, so common in technocratic bodies, can be avoided and outcomes can be less messy.
Conclusion
Participation is as much a problem as it is a solution, as much a goal as an instrument. It is a problem when it is disorderly and it is a big problem if it is assumed to be a substitute for democratic representation. It is a solution when it changes conflict into negotiated losses.
Participation can make development assistance more effective. But it works best for groups that are already able to help themselves.
The recent literature on the effectiveness of foreign aid to developing countries presents an interesting analogy to the findings on participation. Most foreign aid is useless; the only portion that really helps development is that which follows rather than leads policy change (Burnside and Dollar 1997) . Similarly, participation seems to work well only when the institutions of participation are in place before the need they address arises and when the institutions are compatible with its objectives. These conditions, as discussed, are not easily met.
Questions about participation cannot avoid the issue of political power, local power, populism, and representation. They cannot avoid issues of moral pluralism (the variety of ways in which people could value their lives) or cultural diversity. They cannot dismiss the ways in which people can be blocked from better lives by the beliefs of their cultures. They cannot avoid the pressure that a dominant group may exert to forge solutions that are morally unacceptable.
So, after all this, do we conclude that these problems are banal, the stuff of introductory courses in public policy? Perhaps. But even if banal, these problems are not irrelevant or unimportant. Efforts to promote participation would seem strikingly banal were the history of development efforts not replete with failures to achieve participation where it would have made a difference. It has typically been assumed that people, especially poor people, lack the competence to decide for themselves.
Likewise, the failures of participation would seem strikingly banal if people, especially those we are interested in, behaved the way we expected them to behave. In fact people do not behave as expected. Their interests may not be in the collective interest and their goals may not coincide with broader social goals.
maximizes the well-being of the person in the worst position. This does not mesh well with usual behavior. Most of us, when faced with the choice between α = (30, 30, 30) and β = (20, 100, 100), would chose β.
